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The irony of fearing death is beyond comprehension, in that so many people continue to fear death, yet 
they also know that death is the only cer-
tainty in life (Nyatanga, 2001). The other 
intriguing point is how possible it is for 
someone to fear death when they have 
not experienced it themselves? In addi-
tion, one might want to ask, what exactly 
do people fear when they fear death? 
These fundamental questions are the basis 
for the following arguments on whether 
fear of death itself is rational enough for 
us to engage in. 
However, it must be emphasized that 
the ideal of rationality, and its justifica-
tion as the pure source of truth, is beyond 
the scope of this discussion. Furthermore, 
the arguments will be biased towards the 
assumption that death itself creates a state 
of non-existence and nothingness in those 
who are presumed dead.
The fear of death is well documented 
and has been measured by research-
ers for sometime now, e.g. the Collett-
Lester Fear of Death Scale (Lester, 1994). 
It appears that fear of death is experi-
enced by most people with a developed 
concept of life. Although these people 
acknowledge and accept that life has a 
beginning and an end, they still fear the 
end — death. 
Fear of death may also be influenced by 
what meaning people place on death, e.g. 
for themselves and those loved ones they 
leave behind when they die. Although it 
is not yet clear what constitutes fear of 
death exactly, there is, however, a genuine 
belief and consensus that fear of death 
does exist and has a definable base that 
can be quantified.  
Why most people continue  
to fear death
The fact that death is probably the only 
true certainty in life and yet most peo-
ple continue to fear it, seems to have no 
justifiable and logical basis. People who 
continue to fear death without hav-
ing experienced it, prompts the question 
about the logical basis of such fear, and 
what exactly they do fear. One possible 
explanation is that, death, as we know 
it, deprives life of its joys and happiness, 
goals most people try to achieve. Death 
disrupts the possibility of further life and 
the realization of one’s aspirations. 
The goal of happiness and its signifi-
cance can be traced back to Aristotle 
(384–322 BC), who maintained that it 
(happiness) is the highest good; the high-
est good is what is valued for our sake and 
not for the sake of anything else. However, 
using the doctrine from Epicurus (341–
271 BC) and the Epicureans, happiness 
alone is not sufficient as a final state of 
being. Happiness is, therefore, associated 
with pleasure which is perceived as the 
ultimate state of exaltation. 
There are two types of pleasures 
(moving and static) identified by the 
Epicureans, and pleasure itself is also seen 
as satisfying one’s desires. The moving 
pleasures are associated with the proc-
ess of satisfying the desire, e.g. eating a 
cheese burger when one is hungry. The 
actual process of eating would involve 
an active titillation of the senses of taste 
and associated physiology, which would, 
in turn, create the feeling that most peo-
ple refer to as pleasure. It then follows 
that after the desires have been satisfied, 
maybe after a burger or two, and the 
person feels no need or desire for more, 
this state is itself pleasurable, and the 
Epicureans refer to this as static pleasure, 
which also happens to be the best pleas-
ure one can achieve. 
It is important to try and apply this 
idea of pleasure at different levels and 
not just the physical as provided in the 
example above. Psychological pleasures 
can encompass fond memories or regret 
over past mistakes or omissions, while 
fostering future confidence of pleasures 
to occur. 
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or post-death existence, it becomes cru-
cial, if one was to refute the assertion, 
that proof is established of the difference 
between the two extreme existences. This 
was made by Nagel (1970) who argues that 
there is a difference between prenatal and 
posthumous non-existence. His argument 
is simply that, the time after a person’s 
death is a time of which his death deprives 
him. It is a time in which, had he not died, 
he would be alive. Therefore, any death 
entails the loss of some life that its victim 
(the dead) would have led had he not died 
at that or any earlier point in time. 
It can be concluded here that Nagel is 
suggesting implicitly that we cannot say 
something similar about birth, hence he 
exposes the asymmetry between prenatal 
and posthumous non-existence. However, 
what he does not deny is that the dead 
person has not got a concept of this time 
he has been deprived of once he is dead. 
In that case, Lecretius’s argument seems 
to be more persuasive but only at a philo-
sophical level, because in reality people 
still fear death.
What exactly do people fear 
when they fear death?
It is arguably not death itself that people 
fear, but what is associated with its arrival 
or presence. It is more the consequences 
of death than death itself that people fear. 
Death causes a multitude of losses and 
at different levels, e.g. social, psycho-
logical, emotional, physical and spiritual. 
The indiscriminate nature of death often 
leaves people with no control over their 
life and aspirations. 
Some people believe in an afterlife, 
and may fear death, because it may not 
deliver the afterlife they were anticipat-
ing. There are several reasons for this fear, 
one of which could be premature death, 
and hence the dead was not well prepared 
to enter (or be entered into) an afterlife. 
However, the problem of talking about 
a premature death suggests that there is 
somewhat an acceptable point (mature 
death) when death is welcome. 
It is difficult to reject the notion of an 
afterlife, since so many people report 
the experience. However, according to 
Williams (2005), the challenge is on the 
skeptics to prove its non-existence and 
explain it away as for example, a dying 
brain’s mass hallucinating tunnels, or 
lights and voices. The question to ask 
here is if there is an afterlife, what type 
is it going to be, heavenly or hellish. 
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This is important to understand, 
because the Epicureans believed strongly 
that all the happiness and pleasures can 
be destroyed by anxiety about the future, 
especially fear of death. If this destruc-
tion was to be avoided it was, therefore, 
imperative to banish fear about the future 
and death. The teaching was to face the 
future with confidence that one’s desires 
will be met, which will lead to a state 
of ataraxia (total tranquillity) of mind. 
Given this position, it was also important 
equally to demonstrate that fear of death 
had no basis whatsoever in this life.
Is there a basis for fearing death 
without experiencing it?
The rational approach sees no logic in 
fearing something one has not experi-
enced, because one has no real personal 
appreciation of that phenomenon. The 
case of fearing death when it has not 
occurred poses a great philosophical chal-
lenge, and Lecretius (341–271 BC) intro-
duces the symmetry argument against 
fear of death. Lecretius, a poet in the 
Epicureans, argues that no-one fears the 
time before which one existed. 
In other words, no-one is afraid of pre-
natal existence, because one is not aware 
of it. In this context, the time before 
which one existed (pre-birth) is relevantly 
like one’s future non-existence (death). 
The central argument is that one cannot 
be affected negatively in either pre- or 
post-existence periods, as one has no 
experience of either. This point needs fur-
ther discussion, and other people’s views 
would be welcome.
Lecretius claims further that it is rea-
sonable for one to fear something rele-
vantly like what one does not fear only 
if one justifiably believes that the two 
things are different. To complicate it fur-
ther, Lecretius goes on to state that, no-
one justifiably believes that one’s future 
non-existence is relevantly different 
from one’s past prenatal non-existence. 
Therefore, it is not reasonable now to fear 
one’s future non-existence, one’s being 
dead and one’s death.
Therefore, death, the most frighten-
ing of all bad things, is nothing and the 
rationale is given as follows: when we 
exist, death is not yet present and when 
death is present we do not exist. In this 
analogy, death is neither relevant to the 
living nor the dead.
To rehearse the point made earlier about 
being affected negatively by either prenatal 
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Williams believes in the principle that life 
is what you make it and he is convinced 
that the afterlife will be based on the same 
thinking. He gives an example: we can 
kill and end up in prison or we can do 
good things and live contently. Williams 
believes this principle belongs to hell and 
heaven, but, for us, what is even more 
important to consider is that if fear of 
death is justifiable, it would have to be 
the fear of going to hell. 
Conclusion
Given all the above arguments, it is plau-
sible to conclude that there still does not 
seem to be a rational basis for the dying 
person to fear death although, at the same 
time, there is valid argument in those 
around the dying person to fear death. 
As explained earlier, it is the aftermath of 
death, the meaning and impact of death 
that most surviving relatives tend to be 
worried about.
This philosophical commentary has 
provoked different avenues of thought 
and rightly served its purpose for this 
innovative journal. I sincerely hope that 
other readers will feel free and able to 
contribute their thoughts to this com-
mentary, regardless of how diverse their 
views may be. What I have tried to do 
is present one view that challenges the 
entrenched belief that it is rational to con-
tinue to fear death.
It must be noted that this journal is 
proactive in affording such commentaries 
to happen, and for that we should all wel-
come this much needed platform.
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